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The initial study in this series set forth the thesis that public
utilities should be subject to the antitrust laws in inverse proportion
to the degree of control exercised by regulatory agencies. Three suc-
ceeding surveys, examining industries with increasing degrees of regu-
lation, confirmed the propriety of the original thesis, if they failed to
demonstrate its consistent application.
We now turn to a comprehensively controlled industry: the genera-
tion and distribution of electric energy.' Such a business constitutes
the typical public utility today. Federal,
2 state,3 and even municipal 4
agencies are vested with sweeping powers of control over firms in the
industry. Our purpose, as before, is to determine whether the inter-
* Prior installments in this series appeared in 106 U. PA. L. REv. 641 (1958)
(public utilities generally); in 107 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1959) (radio and television
broadcasting); in 108 U. PA. L. REV. 775 (1960) (motor carriers); and in 109
U. PA. L. REv. 311 (1961) (air carriers). The present Article is based upon an
examination of the Federal Power Act, various state power acts, and leading cases
thereunder. The authors also made a page by page examination of volumes 38
through 100 of Public Utility Reports, New Series, and volumes 1 through 13, 21,
and 27 through 31 of Public Utility Reports, Third Series. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of W. P. Gilbert, Esq., of the Illinois bar, whose long
experience in the law of electric utility regulation permitted him to eliminate
several erroneous statements appearing in an earlier draft of this Article.
t A.B. 1935, Yale University; LL.B. 1938, Harvard University; J.S.D. 1940,
University of Chicago. Member, Illinois Bar.
* A.B. 1940, Mount Holyoke College; M.A. 1946, American University. Lec-
turer in Economics, Lake Forest College.
1 We do not consider questions with respect to the definition of public utilities.
See, e.g., Boston Edison Co., 98 P.U.R. (n.s.) 427, 441, 443, 449, 459 (Mass. Dep't
Pub. Util. 1953).
2 Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r
(1958), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823 (Supp. II, 1961). Section 19 of that
act, 41 Stat. 1073 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 812 (1958), provides for jurisdiction over
rates and service of public utilities until state authority is exercised. The FPC
also enjoys authority over interstate transmission of energy. 41 Stat. 1063 (1920),
added by 49 Stat. 847 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824h (1958) ; see TROXEL, ECONOMICS
OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 92-93 (1947) ; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ELECTRIC POWER AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY 196 (1948) [hereinafter cited as POWER AND POLICY]. The
latter is a valuable survey of regulation of the electrical energy industry in action
on which the authors of the present study have relied extensively.
3 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1-344 (Smith-Hurd 1954). Comparable
statutes in other states are described in POWER AND POLICY 54. State controls are
not necessarily comprehensive. POWER AND POLICY 54; TROXEI, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 74, 77.
4 JONES & BIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UrIITIs 166-67, 188-90, 619-22
(1931) ; POWER AND POLICY 106-16. It is generally considered that regulation by
municipalities, particularly the smaller cities, is ineffective. POWER AND POLICY
107-08, 113, 116.
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vention is so pervasive as to render antitrust enforcement impossible
or undesirable.
I. CREATION, MERGERS, AND DIVERSIFICATION
A. Entry
In the free sector of the economy it is axiomatic that entry shall
be as free as economic circumstances permit. The antitrust laws for-
bid the raising of barriers to entry.' In the industry here under
examination, however, both federal 6 and state7 legislation requires a
license either to enter the business of, or to construct facilities for,
the generation of electric power.
It is orthodox doctrine that the license granted an electric utility-
except, in some states, municipal and cooperative companies-is an
exclusive franchise. At least as long as satisfactory service is ren-
dered, no second firm may be admitted into competition with the first
comer. Thus the Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
[The public utility commission act] substitutes reasonable
rates to be determined by the commission for those that would
otherwise be fixed by competition. . . . Under this law it
must therefore be conceded that competition with its dis-
astrous effects is no longer needed to protect the public
against unreasonable rates, hence there is no longer any
justification whatever for competition or the duplication of
utility plants under the pretense of preventing monopoly."
In Wisconsin, the supreme court went so far as to enjoin a municipal
corporation from generating its own power.9 The only apparent ex-
ception to this doctrine was stated by the Illinois Supreme Court:
5 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430-36 (2d Cir.
1945) ; see Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
6 Federal Power Act § 4(e), 49 Stat. 840 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1958);
see Seavey, Functions of the Federal Power Commission, 201 Annals 73, 74 (1939).
Federal licenses for the development of hydroelectric power are issued with a recap-
ture clause which permits the federal government to take over the rights at the
expiration of fifty years. PowER AND POLICY 494. In an inflationary period the
recapture clause might constitute a considerable barrier to entry.
7 E.g., CAL. PuB. UnL. CODE § 1001; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1121 (1959) ; see
BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 213 (1942).
8 Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 248-249, 141 Pac. 1083,
1091 (1941) ; see Trico Elec. Co-op. v. Corporation Comm'n of Ariz., 86 Ariz. 27,
339 P.2d 1046 (1959); People ex rel. New York Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N.Y. 86,
100 N.E. 705 (1912); R. H-. Quinn, 8 P.U.R. (n.s.) 134, 138 (Colo. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1935) ; City of Dover v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 3 P.U.R.3d 181, 191
(Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953); Tri County Elec. Co., 19 P.U.R. (n.s.) 113, 120
(Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1937); Missouri Power & Light Co., 89 P.U.RI (n.s.) 119,
122 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1951); Spingler Elec. Corp., 1933D P.U.R. 493, 507-
08 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Conm'n 1933).
9 Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Beloit, 215 Wis. 439, 254 N.W. 119 (1934)
(based on prohibitory statute).
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If the company now occupying the territory is incapable of
providing adequate service, then, and not until then, will a
situation arise when the public convenience and necessity
may require the establishment of another utility.1'
Similarly, regulated electric utilities may agree with competitors
to divide territory into exclusive sales areas, although such agreements
are illegal per se under the antitrust laws. 1 The common rationale
for permitting such agreements among utilities is that regulation will
counteract the evils of monopoly, competition would increase costs,'
and, in cases of dispute, the utility commission is available to supervise
the drawing of boundary lines between utilities.
13
Nevertheless, a few states permit competition among electric
utility companies.' 4 Competition is more likely to be tolerated from a
governmental body than from another investor-owned utility com-
pany. During the depression there was much dissatisfaction with the
results of regulation. It was thought that governmental competition
might prove economically beneficial and politically attractive. At that
time federal, state, and municipal governments embarked upon pro-
10 Illinois Power Corp. v. Commerce Comm'n, 320 Ill. 427, 429, 151 N.E. 236,
237 (1926) (dictum) ; see Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Consolidated Coal Co.,
251 Ill. App. 49, 74 (1928) (injunction available to prevent rival firm from entering
territory).
11 HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT Or THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS 17 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941); see Intermountain Rural
Elec. Ass'n v. Colorado Power Co., 135 Colo. 42, 49, 307 P.2d 1101, 1105 (1957);
Weld v. Gas & Elec. Light Comm'n, 197 Mass. 556, 84 N.E. 101 (1908); John R.
Murgatroyd, 28 P.U.R.3d 88 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959). Contra, Montana-
Dakota Util. Co. v. Williams Elec. Co-op., 263 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1959); Pennsyl-
vania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d
552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950). See generally Hadley, Public
Utilities and the Antitrust Law, 10 B.U.L. REV. 351, 353-56 (1930).
12 POWER AND PoLIcY 373-79.
13Arizona Edison Co., 61 P.U.R. (n.s.) 5, 10 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1945);
see Union Rural Elec. Ass'n, 17 P.U.R.3d 160, 178, 181 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1957). A consumer may be enjoined from obtaining a supply of electric energy
from a producer who does not have a franchise in the area. Holston River Elec. Co.
v. Hydro Electric Co., 17 Tenn. App. 122, 130, 66 S.W.2d 217, 220 (1933); see
BEHLING, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN PU3LIC UTILITY INDUSTaS 165 (Illinois
Studies in the Social Sciences No. 23, 1938); POWER AND POLICY 29, 30, 57-58.
Compare Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Colorado Power Co., 135 Colo. 42, 307
P.2d 1101 (1957); Rockton Elec. Co. v. South Beloit Water Gas & Elec. Co., 1921D
P.U.R. 17, 19, 21 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1921). In Illinois similar holdings have
been recorded with respect to other types of utilities. E.g., State Pub. Util. Comm'n
ex rel. Clow v. Romberg, 275 Ill. 432, 114 N.E. 191 (1916); Village of Brookfield
v. Goldblatt Bros., 33 P.U.R. (ns.) 82, 92 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1940).
14Fairbanks Morse & Co. v. Texas Elec. Co., 63 F.2d 702, 705-06 (5th Cir.
1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 655 (1933) ; Jones v. Carter, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 450,
101 S.W. 514 (Civ. App. 1907); Clarksburg Elec. Light Co. v. City of Clarksburg,
47 W. Va. 739, 35 S.E. 994 (1900) ; see Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 112 Pa. Super. 500, 171 Ati. 412 (1934); People's Land Mfg. Co. v.
Beyer, 161 Wis. 349, 154 N.W. 382 (1915) (by implication). See also Pennsylvania
Water Co. v. Consolidated Gas Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
906 (1950); State v. Central Power & Light Co., 147 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) (dictum), aff'd, 139 Tex. 51, 161 S.W.2d 766 (1942).
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grams of generating and distributing electricity in competition with
privately owned utilities. The courts frequently sustained the validity
of such enterprises against the argument that the established utility
had protected rights in the field." Nevertheless, they permitted the first
comer to test the legality of competition on other grounds.'
B. Transfers and Mergers
A prime purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent the diminution
of competition through legal arrangements-such as mergers-whereby
an economic joinder of competitors is effected. By contrast, both
federal "8 and state '" legislation for the electric utility industry con-
templates transfers of certificates, conveyances of facilities, interlocking
directorates, mergers, consolidations, and the like, but only upon the
approval of the regulatory agency. This permissiveness is balanced
by a high degree of administrative intervention; indeed, an electric
utility may not even lease or mortgage its plant or purchase securities
of any other public utility without administrative approval."0
Commissions frequently grant approval for mergers of public
utilities.2 ' In doing so, they look to the ability of the consolidated
concern to render adequate public service. They do not seek to pre-
15 See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 139 (1939) ; Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 480 (1938); Western Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of
Minatare, 99 F.2d 844, 845-46 (8th Cir. 1938); Carolina Power & Light Co. v.
South Carolina Authority, 94 F.2d 520, 523 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Mississippi Power Co. v.
Starkville, 4 F. Supp. 833, 836 (N.D. Miss. 1932); cf. Public Serv. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 142 Colo. 135, 350 P.2d 543 (1960). See generally POWER AND
POLICY 115, 338, 386-95; Kneier, Competitive Operation of Municipally and Privately
Owned Utilities, 47 MIcH. L. Rv. 639, 642, 644 (1949).
16 Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Independence, 79 F.2d 32, 35 (10th Cir.
1935); cf. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. City of Kennett, 78 F.2d 911 (8th Cir.
1935). Compare Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 928
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
17 See Hale, Mergers and Acquisitions, 41 CHr. BAR Rc. 185 (1960).
18 Federal Power Act §§ 8, 203, 49 Stat. 817, 849 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 801,
824(b) (1958). See Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341
U.S. 246, 252-53 (1951) (dictum); Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 9 F.P.C. 91 (1950);
Seavey, supra note 6, at 73, 76. Federal antitrust legislation, in regulating the
acquisition by one company of stock in another, provides that "Nothing contained
in this section shall apply to transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority
given by the . . . Federal Power Commission. . . ." Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat.
1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The foregoing
language suggests that the exception provided by § 7 might not be applicable to public
utilities insofar as they are regulated by state authorities.
19 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1954) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
111%, § 27 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960). The older law is represented by the decision
in Dunbar v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 Ill. 456, 87 N.E. 521 (1909).
2 OE.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, §§27(b)-(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 29 (Smith-Hurd 1954). See generally BARNES, op. cit. s.ipra
note 7, at 212-14; POWER AND POLIcY 73, 186-87, 254, 279.
21 See Phelan v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 24 Misc. 109, 53 N.Y. Supp. 305
(Sup. Ct 1898); Motter v. Kennett Twp. Elec. Co., 212 Pa. 613, 62 At. 104
(1905) ; 1953 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. ANN. Rae. 10.
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serve competition between the parties to the merger; regulation is
relied upon to curb monopoly power." In many instances the com-
missions have been convinced that economies of scale resulting from
the merger would prove beneficial to the public-that the consolidated
concern would enjoy lower costs which would redound to the benefit
of patrons.1
3
An electric utility is not allowed to abandon its business without
commission approval.24 Owing to the growth of demand for electric
energy, abandonment has not frequently been the subject of adminis-
trative action. If and when the industry enters into a declining state,
abandonment may become a more active topic.
C. Diversification and Dispersion
While merger of rival electric utilities has generally been approved,
public policy has sometimes frowned upon diversification of a utility
into allied fields and dispersion of its lines over a broad territory.
Such diversification and dispersion can, of course, result from internal
growth as well as from merger. Most of the antagonism to such
utility growth has been manifested in the administration of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,25 another depression-born
measure aimed at the then unpopular utility industry.
Under state law a single corporation is usually permitted to en-
gage in the business of supplying electric energy and at the same time
to furnish gas, hot water and steam heat, traction, and other utility
services to patrons in its area2 In administering the Public Utility
22 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 14 F.P.C. 706 (1955) ; Manila Elec. Co. &
Gen. Pub. Util. Corp., 37 S.E.C. 623 (1956); Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 100
P.U.R. (n.s.) 129, 152 (Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953); POWER AND POLICY
342, 343-44, 353-55; TRoxE_, op. cit. supra note 2, at 167. Compare Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 10 F.P.C. 688 (1951); Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 36 S.E.C. 159
(1955); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 32 S.E.C. 202 (1951) ; State Pub. Util. Comm'n
ex tel. Clow v. Romberg, 275 Ill. 432, 439-40, 445, 114 N.E. 191, 194, 196 (1916).
23 See Scranton Elec. Co., 15 F.P.C. 1078 (1956); American Gas & Elec. Co.,
32 S.E.C. 130 (1951); PoWv AND POLICY 340, 342; TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 29-31. But see 1953 KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT Co. ANN. REP. 17. The
older view, under which mergers were disapproved, is represented by Keene Syn-
dicate v. Wichita Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 69 Kan. 284, 76 Pac. 834 (1904) ;
San Antonio Gas Co. v. State, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 54 S.W. 289 (Civ. App. 1899).
Compare People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N.E.
798 (1899) ; People ex rel. FitzHenry v. Union Gas & Elec. Co., 254 Ill. 395, 409, 98
N.E. 768, 773 (1912) (dictum).
2 4 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 49a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); see, e.g., Appli-
cation of Casco Castle Co., 141 Me. 222, 42 A.2d 43 (1945); Commonwealth Edison
Co., 63 P.U.R. (n.s.) 129 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1946); TRoxEL, op. cit. s1upra
note 2, at 485.
25 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1958).
26 See, e.g., People ex rel. Municipal Gas Co. v. Rice, 138 N.Y. 151, 33 N.E.
846 (1893); Motter v. Kennett Twp. Elec. Co., 212 Pa. 613, 62 Atl. 104 (1905);
TRoxL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 202-03.
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Holding Company Act, however, which required the disintegration of
large electric utility systems, the SEC has taken the position that gas
and other distribution systems must be separated from electric hold-
ings." It has been questioned whether the "competition" thus made
possible will prove of significant benefit to the public, and even whether
the purpose of keeping the different types of utility service separate is
to promote competition.- The aim may be to avoid that discrimina-
tion which results when one type of service is operated at a loss and
must be sustained by patrons of the other. In recent years, for ex-
ample, utility companies furnishing both electric energy and traction
service have sometimes been required to subsidize the latter with
revenues from the former.29 In many states, however, each "depart-
ment" is required to be self-supporting."
A principal purpose of the "death sentence" imposed by the
Holding Company Act was, of course, to reduce the geographic size
of electric utility systems. Apparently the theory behind the statute
was that far flung holding companies were so powerful that the state
commissions were unable to regulate them in accordance with local
desires." Whatever rational basis may exist for such hostility to
geographic dispersion, it did not reflect a desire to promote competi-
tion. 2 The purpose was not to create rivalry among electric generat-
ing and distributing companies; rather, the goal was to reduce the
wealth and economic power of those who managed utility holding
companies.
The sale of appliances by electric utilities has also been a fruitful
source of controversy. The utilities regard the promotion of appliance
sales as desirable because of the increase in line loads resulting there-
from.33 In general, the courts and commissions have taken a similar
view, despite the protests of "independent" appliance dealers.3" Such
27 See Louisiana Gas Serv. Co., 38 S.E.C. 129 (1957); Electric Bond & Share
Co., 33 S.E.C. 21, 37-38 (1952); New England Elec. Sys., 32 S.E.C. 215 (1951);
TRoxEL, op. cit. supra 'note 2, at 203; Comment, Geographic Integration Under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act, 50 YALE L.J. 1045, 1052 (1941). A state case
following the SEC view is Lynn Gas & Elec. Co., 31 P.U.R13d 209, 212-13 (Mass.
Dep't Pub. Util. 1959).
28 TRoxEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 190-191, 200.
29 See St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 403, 405-06, 409 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1959).30 E.g., Tampa Elec. Co., 37 P.U.R. (n.s.) 440, 459 (Tampa (Fla.) Util. Bd.
1940); Consumers Power Co., 99 P.U.R. (n.s.) 414 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1952); accord, Fleming v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 388 Ill. 138, 153-54, 57
N.E.2d 384, 392 (1944), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S. 823 (1945).
3
3See 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79a (1958); S. REP. No. 621, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935). See generally TRoXEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 171,
172, 181.
32See generally HALE & HALE, MARKET PowEa ch. 7 (1958).
33See 58 SouTXERx CAL. EDIsoN Co. ANN. REP. 19 (1954).
34 See Public Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. 150, 160-61, 153 A.2d 801, 808-09
(1959); City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 29 P.U.R. (n.s.) 193,
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activity upon the part of the utilities-as the protests of the "inde-
pendent" dealers suggest-is likely to promote rather than retard
competition in the appliance field, but it does not affect competition in
the distribution of electric energy.
II. NORMAL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
A. Service
Antitrust legislation has no direct bearing upon the quality of
products supplied by industry. It merely serves to keep the channels
of trade open and to encourage competition in providing better
products. In contrast, commissions are vested with abundant authority
to regulate the amount and quality of service to be rendered by electric
utility companies."5 Not only are such companies under a duty to
serve all patrons who may apply, but there is no lack of statutory
authority for the detailed supervision of the quality of this service.36
When a patron seeking service which a utility must provide is not
geographically adjacent to existing lines, a question of involuntary
dispersion may arise. Tariff rules generally require the customer to
contribute to the expense of the extension or to make a deposit thereon
when more than specified distances are involved. 7 In some instances,
200-01 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1939); Groggins v. New York Edison Co., 16
P.U.R. (n.s.) 365, 371-72 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1936). But vee Peoples Light
& Coke v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 64-66, 25 N.E.2d 482, 498-99 (1940) ; Montana-Dakota
Util. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 355, 362-63 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959). Compare
Consumers' Sanitary Coffee & Butter Stores v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 348
Ill. 615, 181 N.E. 411 (1932). See generally HALE & HALE, MARKET POWER 202-39
(1958). Legislation frequently provides for commission inquiry into the unregulated
business. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 8 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
35 See, e.g., Federal Power Act § 207, 49 Stat. 853 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 824f
(1958); Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, §§32, 33, 38, 49, 53, 54 (Smith-Hurd 1954);
POWER AND POLICY 163.
36 Commissions utilize such powers to prescribe the precise manner in which
electric service shall be rendered. In Maryland, for example, an electric utility
desired to install a new 220-volt line eight feet away from the location of an existing
110-volt line. The patron, a householder, sought to have the new wire installed at
the same location as the former one. The patron prevailed and the utility was re-
quired to use the old point of entrance. Aquilla v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 31
P.U.R.3d 361 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959). In another instance, a public utility
changed its rules and required a safer entrance switch box with a ground connection.
Old patrons, however, were permitted to continue the use of the former switch box.
Commission approval was given to the rules, but the fact that such approval was
necessary indicates the detail in which electric utility service is regulated. Hawkins v.
Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp., 98 Vt. 176, 126 Atl. 517 (1924); accord, Hunt v.
Marianna Elec. Co., 114 Ark. 498, 170 S.W. 96 (1914); F. & R. Lazarus & Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 223, 122 N.E.2d 783 (1954); Texas Power &
Light Co. v. Doering Hotel Co., 147 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). In the latter
two cases the regulations of the utility were held discriminatory in character. See
TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 464-66. Compare Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R.,
311 U.S. 295 (1940).
3 7 E.g., Illinois Power Company Tariff No. 10, Rule 3.2(b) (extensions of three
phase facilities beyond two poles at patron's expense).
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however, commissions require extension of lines even though dis-
crimination against centrally located patrons may result. 8  On the
other hand, electric utilities are not usually required to sell at whole-
sale rates unless they have "held themselves out" to do so."9  "Sub-
metering" may provide a measure of competition between the company
generating the electricity and another distributor. In Massachusetts,
however, the supreme judicial court sustained an order eliminating
submetering, saying that state policy encouraged a monopoly of elec-
tricity supply.40 In New York and Illinois submetering has also been
forbidden, and wholesale rates may be "closed" to new patrons.41
B. Operations
One might suppose that the management of an electric utility
would retain considerable discretion with respect to internal opera-
tions. No doubt it does enjoy a measure of discretion with respect to
methods of production, manner of distribution, employee relations and
the like.4  At the same time, commissions exercise considerable au-
thority even over such matters.4
38 Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 155 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'rs
1959) ; see TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 473. But cf. Georgia Power Co. v.
Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 211 Ga. 223, 85 S.E.2d 14 (1954). Compare McDONALD,
LET THER BE LIGHT 284-85 (1957).
39 City of High Point v. Duke Power Co., 34 F. Supp. 339, 342-43 (M.D.N.C.
1940), aff'd on other grounds, 120 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1941) ; Georgia Power Co. v.
Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 211 Ga. 223, 85 S.E.2d 14 (1954) ; Chicago Dist. Pipe-
line Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 361 Ill. 296, 197 N.E. 873 (1935). In City
of High Point v. Duke Power Co., supra, the court wrote:
Under the law of North Carolina it is well settled that one public service
corporation cannot be made to supply a competitor, another public service
corporation of like character, with the material to enable the latter to dis-
charge its duty to the public. . . . It seems to be the rule prevailing every-
where that where a public service corporation is adequately serving the public
through its own facilities it cannot be compelled to serve the same" public
through the facilities of a competitor or to supply a competitor with the
means of competition.
Id. at 343. Compare Wisconsin Trailer Coach Ass'n v. Wisconsin Power & Light
Co., 91 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65, 71 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1951).
40 Boston Real Estate Bd. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 334 Mass. 477, 136
N.E.2d 243 (1956), afflrming Boston Edison Co., 98 P.U.R. (n.s.) 427, 431, 441
(Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1953).
41 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 30 P.U.R.3d 479, 492 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1959); Illinois Power Company Tariff No. 5, Rate No. 40 § 1. See City of St.
Charles v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 21 Ill. 2d 259, 172 N.E.2d 353 (1961).
42 In Massachusetts, for example, an electric utility cannot be compelled to carry
energy underground purely for aesthetic reasons. Residents of Princeton Street v.
Charlestown Gas Co., 1925B P.U.R. 362 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1924).
43 Thus the Illinois statute provides:
The commission shall have general supervision of all public utilities . . . . It
shall . . . keep informed as to their general condition, their franchises,
capitalization, rates and other charges, and the manner in which their plants,
equipment and other property owned, leased, controlled or operated are man-
aged, conducted and operated ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 8 (Smith-Hurd 1954); see Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 414 Ill. 275, 281, 111 N.E.2d 329, 333 (1953). Numerous
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In actual practice, utility management retains some discretion
either alone or with commission approval to effect changes in methods
of operation. Over the years, for example, Southern California
Edison has gradually switched from dependence upon water power to
oil and gas-fired steam boilers as a source of energy." The Arizona
Public Service Company has installed new bookkeeping machines, and
Indianapolis Power has run its modern, low-cost plant at full capacity
and curtailed the output of its older stations in order to effect an over-
all reduction of expenses.45 Similarly, it has been held improper for a
commission to reduce allowances for current operating expenses with
respect to the maintenance of facilities below the amounts actually ex-
pended4 Nevertheless, commissions have been permitted to control
other statutory provisions permit specific controls to be exercised. Thus, under the
Illinois Public Utility Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111% (Smith-Hurd 1954), a utility
must "furnish the Commission with all information required to carry into effect
the provisions of the act' (§ 9); commission approval is required before a utility
may divert its assets to a nonregulated business (§ 9), contract to operate lines or
plants in connection with another utility (§27(a)), guarantee the obligations of
another person or firm (§27(f)), or construct a new plant or additions to the
old plant (§ 56); a utility must file with the commission all contracts with other
utilities (§ 33) ; the commission may prescribe methods of operation to safeguard the
safety of employees and the public (§ 49); and the commission may order the con-
struction of new facilities if it finds existing service to be inadequate (§ 50). But cf.
Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 211 Ga. 223, 227, 85 S.E.2d
14, 19 (1954), where the court held that "no Georgia statute . . . confers upon the
. . . Commission authority to require one public utility to buy or merge with an-
other .... "
The Federal Power Act §202, 49 Stat. 847 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §824 (1958),
authorizes the Federal Power Commission to order the establishment of intercon-
nections and to arrange the exchange of energy. See also Federal Power Act
§10(h), 49 Stat. 844 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §803(h) (1958): "Combinations, agree-
ments, arrangements, or understandings, express or implied, to limit the output of
electrical energy, to restrain trade, or to fix, maintain, or increase prices for elec-
trical energy or service are hereby prohibited." It is not apparent what useful func-
tion could be served by the foregoing statutory provision.
44 58 SouTHR CAi EDISON Co. ANN. RE. 13, 18-19 (1954). Note that another
utility as early as 1953 participated in studies investigating the feasibility of utilizing
atomic reactors to generate electric power. 1953 AMERICAN GAS & ELEc. Co. ANN.
REP. 16.
451953 ARIZONA Pur. SFmV. Co. ANN. REP. 4; 1953 INDIANAPOLIS POWER &
LIGHT Co. ANN. REP. 10. The latter company reported that it had organized
an economy committee, which by intensive efforts had succeeded in effecting impor-
tant savings in various details of its operations. It had simplified customer billing,
put in modern electronic equipment to do clerical work, and the like. Id. at 16.
Another utility company retained engineers to study its service area and to predict
future demand. The object was to forecast needs for expansion. 1953 KANSAS CITY
PowER & LIGHT Co. ANN. REP. 17. Still another utility ordered an incremental
transmission-loss computer to determine the most efficient use of circuits and gen-
erating facilities under any set of operating conditions. 1953 AMERICAN GAS & ELEC.
Co. ANN. REP. 15. See TRoxEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 221, 549.
46 Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 375 Ill. 31, 61-62, 25 N.E.2d 482,
497 (1939). In the same case the court also held it improper for the commission to
allow less than the full amount of assessed local taxes as operating expenses, stating
that it was unwarranted for the commission to assume that the company would litigate
the taxes and succeed in securing their reduction. Id. at 61, 25 N.E.2d at 497. Simi-
larly, a commission may accept a public utility's figures for boiler and generator
maintenance in a rate-making case, Southern Cal. Edison Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 15, 26
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just such matters in detail. In fixing rates, for example, the Illinois
commission disallowed various expenditures on the ground that a
greater use of coal gas and less use of water gas would have been
more economical 4 7  Similarly, the California commission reduced
Southern California Edison's claimed expenses for damage suits, say-
ing that experience showed lesser amounts would suffice to satisfy
claimants.
4 s
The classic case of the divergence of utility regulation from the
antitrust philosophy occurs in the area of interconnection of systems
to form "power pools." 4' Thus the FPC directed the maintenance of
arrangements5o substantially identical to those held illegal under the
Sherman Act in the familiar Penn Water litigation.5
During the holding company era, it was common for operating
electric utilities to enter into contracts for the performance of manage-
ment services by the holding company or affiliated interests. It was
widely suspected that such contracts afforded a means of syphoning off
profits which would otherwise have been destroyed by rate reductions.
As a consequence, commissions carefully scrutinize such service con-
tracts and are empowered to abrogate them if they are found not to be
in the public interest.52
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957); it may approve payments for research expenses
in the development of a nuclear power plant, Yankee Atomic Elec. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d
308, 312-13 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1959) ; and it may approve the sale and leaseback
of an office building constructed and used by the utility company to permit dispersion
of its clerical staff, Kansas City Power & Light Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 236, 239 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1957).
47 The Illinois court approved the action of the commission but warned it against
substituting its judgment for that of the board of directors of the company. State
Pub Utils. Comm'n ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 291 Ill. 209,
234, 125 N.E. 891, 901 (1920).
48 Southern Cal. Edison Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 15, 27 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957).
Note that in several states electric utilities are required to present annual budgets
in advance for approval to commissions. POWER AND POLICY 59, 254.
49 Commissions frequently compel or permit such interchange. See, e.g., Texas
Elec. Serv. Co., 9 F.P.C. 1373 (1950) (compelling power pool); POWER AND POLICY
54, 183, 184-85.
50 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 8 F.P.C. 1, rehearing denied, 8 F.P.C. 170,
order amended, 8 F.P.C. 1193 (1949), aff'd, 193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd,
343 U.S. 414 (1952).
51 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power
Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950). See also Pennsylvania
Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954) ; Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power
Co. v. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 194 F.2d 89, 95, 98 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 963 (1952).
52See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111%, §8(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960);
TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 238, 245-49 (1947); POWER AND POLICY
77, 126-27, 190, 253-56. Note also the drastic power which commissions may exer-
cise to abrogate contracts with patrons. See Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City
Power & Light Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937); cf. Hite v. Cincinnati I. & W.R.R., 284
Ill. 297, 119 N.E. 904 (1918).
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Labor relations lie largely within the sphere of management
discretion. Thus management may bargain with unions over wage
increases, inaugurate safety programs, and the like.53 Commissions,
however, consider wage increases in the rate-making process 54 and
from time to time exercise their authority to control employee com-
pensation. Thus the Michigan commission disallowed the expense of
a discount on merchandise sold by an electric utility's appliance depart-
ment as a means of compensating employees. 55
Even stockholder relations are not free from commission control.
The Missouri commission, for example, expressed the opinion that the
management of an electric utility should furnish its stockholders blank
proxies for the annual meeting, which the shareholders might return
to management or others as they saw fit.5" Donations to charity also
fall under the scrutiny of regulatory authorities which, from time to
time, disallow such expenses."
Management usually enjoys considerable discretion with respect
to sales and promotional methods. Thus efforts are made to attract
industry to the territory through the employment of personnel furnish-
ing territorial information and data of interest to prospective indus-
tries,58 and engineers may even be detailed to work with schools in
home economics courses. 59 Commissions nevertheless scrutinize such
53 See 1953 AaIERICAN GAS & ELEC. Co. ANN. REP. 17; 1953 KANSAS CITY
PowER & LIGHT Co. ANN. REP. 15; 1953 PUBLIC SERV. E.zLc. & GAS Co. ANN. REP.
14, 15.
54 See Central Me. Power Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 113, 127 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1959), modified, 156 Me. 295, 163 A.2d 762 (1960); Consumers Power Co., 29
P.U.R.3d 133, 138-39 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959); Missouri Power & Light
Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 404, 410 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957).
55 Consumers Power Co., sipra note 54, at 136. The appliance department of
an electric utility is usually unregulated. 'Where the utility elects to compensate
its employees partly by granting a discount on the sale of appliances, the fact that
the appliance department is unregulated would not seem to require disallowance of
such a method of compensation. As to salaries paid to executives, see TROXEL, op. cit.
mspra note 52 at 241.
56Union Elec. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 254, 266 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959). In
the same case, however, the Missouri commission refused to force the utility to issue
preemptive rights to shareholders in order to alleviate the need for attracting addi-
tional capital. It said that utilization of such rights fell within the discretion of
management. Ibid. Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 838
(1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79j (1958), the SEC has exercised control over the composition
of boards of directors. POWER AND POLICY 321-25.
57See Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 64, 25 N.E.2d 482,
498 (1940), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 634 (1940); Central Me. Power Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 233, 136 A.2d 726, 731 (1957); Consumers
Power Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 133, 136 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959). Compare Pub-
lic Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. 150, 160-61, 153 A.2d 801, 808-09 (1959), affirming,
27 P.U.R.3d 113, 125 (N.H. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959); Vrtjak v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 385 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n).
58 1953 AMERICAN GAs & ELEC. Co. ANN. REP. 11, 17; 1953 DUQUESNE LIGHT
Co. ANN. REP. 4; 1953 INDIANAPOLIS POWER & LIGHT Co. ANN. REP. 14-15; WELCH,
PREPARING FOR THE PUBLIC UTILITY RATE CASE 227 (1954).
59 1953 KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT Co. ANN. REP. 15.
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expenditures 60 and from time to time disallow promotional expenses
on one ground or another.6
C. Rates.
Antitrust statutes reflect a belief that monopolies and restraints
of trade enhance prices." Accordingly, they seek to insure that pricing
results from the free play of market forces. By contrast, the fixing
of rates is a central feature of the control of electric utilities, and to
that end ample authority is vested in the regulatory commissions. The
regulatory process, of course, reaches rules and regulations as well as
the dollar amounts charged by the utility.' Statutes customarily re-
quire utilities to file tariffs with the commission which bind both utility
and patron until they are changed according to prescribed procedures.
The utility must initiate the rate-making process by filing the tariff,'
but the commission may be obliged to set rates if a tariff is set aside
under its statutory authority.65 Moreover, it is apparent that utility
management is generally conscious of administrative power to reject
filed rates and deliberately scales rates down to levels that it believes
are acceptable to the regulatory bodies.66
A striking feature of rate regulation is the ability of commissions
to abrogate contracts between public utilities and their patrons. The
procedures for altering contractual rates differ somewhat from one
jurisdiction to another, but there is no doubt of the power of adminis-
trative agencies to change prices arrived at by negotiation between the
electric utility and its patron, at least when their effect is to shift
60 Southern Cal. Edison Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 15, 27 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1957); Union Elec. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 254, 266 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959).
61 Central Me. Power Co. v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 243-46,
136 A.2d 726, 736-37 (1957); cf. Consumers Power Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 133, 138
(Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959); Uniform Sys. of Accounts for Elec. Utils., 21
P.U.R.3d 412, 413 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957). The latter two decisions con-
cerned the propriety of including as an expense advertisements against public owner-
ship of electric power facilities.
6 2 THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY-ORIGINATION OF AN AmERICAN
TRADITION 54-163 (1955).
63E.g., Federal Power Act §§ 19, 20, 201, 205, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), as amended,
49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 812, 813, 824, 824d (1958) ; Illinois Public Utility
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 11, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 41 (Smith-Hurd 1954);
POWER AND POLICY 54, 69.
64 Pennsylvania Water Co. v. Consolidated Gas Co,, 184 F.2d 552, 567 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950); Streator Aqueduct Co. v. Smith, 295
Fed. 385, 388 (S.D. Ill. 1923); Lowden v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 376 Ill. 225,
231, 33 N.E.2d 430, 434 (1941).
65 Compare Illinois Public Utility Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 41 (Smith-
Hurd 1954), with Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
5 Ill. 2d 195, 206-07, 125 N.E.2d 269, 275 (1955). It is interesting to note that com-
petitive bidding requirements are frequently dispensed with when a regulated public
utility is the only possible supplier of energy. Murphy v. Paull, 192 Wis. 93, 96,
212 N.W. 402, 403 (1927).
66 TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 52, at 557-59.
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burdens to other customers.67 In all instances the filed tariff must pre-
vail regardless of contractual obligations.68
In order to assure that rate regulation will result in control of
utility profits, legislation has authorized commissions to regulate ac-
counting practices of utilities, 9 sometimes in great detail, 70 and it is
common for the commissions to prescribe in detail the methods of
depreciation which may be used by utilities and taken into account in
determining revenue needs."
The effects of rate regulation are not wholly clear. Rates and
costs of unregulated utilities are not necessarily higher than those of
regulated ones.72 Despite the contentions of advocates of the "original
cost," "prudent cost," and "replacement cost" theories of rate base
determination, 73 it appears that most commissions today fix rates on
the attraction of capital theory, which allows rates that will give an
investment return approximately equal to the cost of money, thereby
67 City of Lamar v. Town of Wiley, 80 Colo. 18, 24, 248 Pac. 1009, 1011 (1926) ;
Jefferson Bldg. Corp. v. Central Ill. Light Co., 350 Ill. 237, 240-41, 183 N.E. 19, 21
(1932); Commonwealth ex rel. Page Milling Co. v. Shenandoah River & Power
Corp., 135 Va. 47, 72-73, 115 S.E. 695, 702-03 (1923); Central Me. Power Co.,
8 P.U.R.3d 61, 63 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1955), modified, 156 Me. 295, 163 A.2d
762 (1960) ; cf. Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. FPC, 223 F.2d 605, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
aff'd, 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956); Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 233 Ala. 675, 678, 173 So. 19, 20 (1937); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 5 Ill. 2d 195, 125 N.E.2d 269 (1955) ; Schiller Piano Co. v.
Illinois No. Util. Co., 288 Ill. 580, 587, 123 N.E. 631, 633-34 (1919). See also
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
68E.g., United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 297 Fed. 575, 578 (8th
Cir. 1924); Halifax Paper Co. v. Roanoke Rapids Sanitary Dist., 232 N.C. 421,
428, 61 S.E.2d 378, 384 (1950) ; Messaponax Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 166 Va. 405, 413, 186 S.E. 3, 7 (1936).
6 9 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 11 (Smith-Hurd 1954); MONT. R-v. CODES
ANN. § 70-107 (1947) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1211 (1959).
70 Accounting Procedures, 21 P.U.R.3d 414 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957);
Consumers Power Co., 30 P.U.R.3d 251, 257-58 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959);
POWER AND PoLICY 54, 174-75; TRoXEL, op. cit. supra note 52, at 77-78, 115-37; see
McD NALD, op. cit. supra note 38, at 322.
71 POWER AND PoLIcY 54. A current controversy is whether a utility company
which takes advantage of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 167 (depreciation) and 168
(amortization of emergency facilities) may "normalize" federal income taxes on its
books so as to fix its rates at a level which permits it to retain the benefits of these
sections. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 15, 21 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1957); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 28 P.U.R.3d 171, 193 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1959); Union Elec. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 177, 189-90 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n
1959) ; Swiren, Acclerated Depreciation Tax Benefits in Utility Rate Making, 28
U. CHI. L. REv. 629 (1961).
72 POWER AND POLICY 208-09, 223-24, 227, 238, 241.
73 For a discussion of the theories of rate base determination, see City of Chicago
v. Illinois Commerce Com'n, 4 Ill. 2d 554, 558-60, 123 N.E.2d 500, 502-03 (1954) ;
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 414 Ill. 275, 290, 111 N.E.2d 329,
337 (1953) ; CLEMENS, EcoNoMIcs AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, 140-61 (1950) ; POWER AND
POLICY 123-25. Competition somewhat affects rate levels under the "value of service"
principle. State Pub. Util. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas &
Elec. Co., 291 Ill. 209, 218, 125 N.E. 891, 895 (1920). It does not appear, however, that
commissions attempt to simulate competitive pricing in the regulation of utility earn-
ings. TRoxEL, op. cit. =pra note 52, at 214.
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attracting enough capital for needed plant improvements and no more.74
In some areas incentive plans have been established to induce rate
reductions on the promise that a part of whatever additional profits
may result from higher demand schedules will accrue to stockholders. 7
Nevertheless, the role of competition in determining rates is generally
negligible.7 6  And although it is sometimes asserted that government-
owned facilities provide a "yardstick" for rates,7 7 the value of this
measure is offset by such factors of difference as tax exemptions, and
is certainly dubious in discontiguous territories where costs almost
invariably differ.7"
D. Discrimination
In the free sector of the economy the Robinson-Patman Act 7
contains a vigorous if somewhat blundering prohibition of discrim-
inatory practices. By its terms the legislation is applicable to the
sale of commodities rather than to the rendering of services and hence
does not control the relationship between an electric utility and its
patrons. Stringent legislation on the subject of discrimination, how-
ever, has long been a prominent feature of public utility regulation."0
At the same time, distributors of electricity are permitted to classify
their services and to charge different prices, provided the classifications
74 See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 414 Ill. 275, 286, 287,
111 N.E.2d 329, 335, 336 (1953) ; State Pub. Util. Comm'n ax rel. City of Spring-
field v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 291 Ill. 209, 217, 218, 125 N.E. 891, 895, 896
(1920); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 206, 213 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comrn'n
1959); Central Me. Power Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 113, 131-32 (Me. Comm'n 1959);
Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 355, 364 (Mont Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959);
McDONALD, op. cit. supra note 38, at 120; NICHOLs, RULING PRINCIPLES OF UTILITIES
REGULATION 61-62 (1955); Brozen, Welfare Theory, Technological Change and
Public Utility Investment, 27 LAND ECON. 123, 125 (1951). Under the "cost of capital"
theory questions may arise as to fairness between old and new stockholders. An
original stockholder may have paid $100 per share. Changes in interest rates and
other factors may compel later sales of stock at $80. Is it proper to let the share-
holders participate equally in dividends? The same question does not necessarily arise
in unregulated fields where expansion is voluntary.
75 Scharff, An Incentive Plan of Rate Adjustment, 16 J. LAND & P.U. EcON. 475
(1940).
7 6 See POWER AND POLICY 115, 218, 219.
77 See Joint Comm. on the Investigation of the Tennessee Valley Authority,
Report, S. Doc. No. 56, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 185-98 (1939). But see id. at 285-90
(minority views).
78 See Georgia Power & Light Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 8 F. Supp. 603
(N.D. Ga. 1934); Southern Berkshire Power & Elec. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 296, 301
(Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1959). But cf. Jourolmon, Social Performance of Public
Utilities: Effects of Monopoly and Competition, 17 TENN. L. REv. 308, 313 (1942).
79 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
80 See Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co.,
159 Wis. 130, 136, 150 N.W. 411, 412 (1914), aff'd per curiam, 245 U.S. 633 (1917) ;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 37-39 (Smith-Hurd 1954), as amended, ILL. ANN. STAT.
§ 39 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960). The burden of proof, however, is on the patron to
show that the rate is discriminatory against him. City of St Charles v. Illinois Com-
merce Comm'n, 21 Ill. 2d 259, 172 N.E.2d 353 (1961).
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are reasonable."' As in the case of the railroads, adherence to filed
tariffs is relied upon to prevent discrimination; contracts inconsistent
with the filed tariffs are broadly condemned. 2
Electric utilities are prevented from favoring one patron at the
expense of another; commissions vigorously stamp out personal dis-
crimination of that kind.83 Indeed, it has been common in the electric
field to separate rates into a demand charge and an energy charge in
order to make sure that each patron pays no more than his share of
the cost.8 At the same time, the existence of competition frequently
causes rates to differ widely among classes of customers. Thus indus-
trial patrons often enjoy preferential rates because they are most likely
to be able to generate their own electricity.88 Time and distance are
also factors in customer classification. A patron located near the
generating plant may well pay a lower rate than a rural patron many
miles away.86 Nevertheless, billing complexities which would result
from infinite gradations have led commissions to establish zones
within which rates are uniform, even though patrons on the fringes
of the zones may enjoy some advantages over those situated nearer
the center.87 Again, a patron who needs service only during "off-
8 1
E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, §32 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
82 Jefferson Bldg. Corp. v. Central Ill. Light Co., 350 Ill. 237, 183 N.E. 19
(1932) ; In re Ransom's Estate, 219 Iowa 284, 288, 258 N.W. 78, 80 (1934) ; Spring-
field Gas & Elec. Co., 1920A P.U.R. 446, 475-76 (Ill. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1920).8 3 State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Mead Corp., 238 N.C. 451, 462, 78 S.E.2d
290, 298 (1953); F. & R. Lazarus & Co. v. Public Util. Comn'n, 162 Ohio St. 223,
122 N.E.2d 783 (1954); cf. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Associated Press, 228 N.Y.
370, 127 N.E. 256 (1920); Kousal v. Texas Power & Light Co., 142 Tex. 407, 179
S.W.2d 283 (1944); Walnut Creek v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 81, 87
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 206, 224
(D.C. Comm'n 1959); Southern Berkshire Power & Elec. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 296,
301-02 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1959).
84 See Antioch Milling Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 4 Ill. 2d 200, 206-08, 123 N.E.2d
302, 306 (1954) ; South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 365
Ill. 218, 219-21, 6 N.E.2d 152, 153 (1936) ; New York Edison Co., 16 P.U.R. (n.s.) 120,
131-34 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Commn 1936); TRoxEL, op. cit. suPra note 52, at 598-610
(1947) ; WELcH, op. cit. supra note 58, at 292-94 (1954).
85 See Boston Edison Co., 98 P.U.R. (n.s.) 427, 452-53 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util.
1953); POWER AND POLICY 131, 216-20, 245; cf. Tampa Elec. Co., 30 P.U.R.3d 75
(Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comnm'n 1959). See generally CLEMENs, EcoNoMIcs AND
PuBLic UTILITIES 247-73 (1950).
86 See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 15, 34-37 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1957); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 206, 223 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1959); W. I. Bohannon, 8 P.U.R. (n.s.) 173, 177-78 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1934); Cross Plains Elec. Co., 88 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1951);
Kennedy, Territorial Aspects of Electric Rate Making by the Public Utilities Cont-
nission of California, 26 LAND EcoN. 325 (1950).
87See Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra note 86, at 34-37; Grant-Pacific Rock
Co., 63 P.U.R. (n.s.) 484 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1946); Kennedy, supra note 86, at 325,
327, 331. But see Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 335, 359, 365-66 (Mont.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959); Village of Black Earth, 31 P.U.R.3d 402 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1959). A similar problem in boundary determination occurs when one
patron occupies two or more nearby premises. See, e.g., Sheets v. Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 171 Pa. Super. 151, 154, 90 A.2d 633, 635 (1952); Atlas-United
Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 1 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1959); Consolidated Edison Co., 28
P.U.R.3d, 243, 287 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959).
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peak" hours or seasons may receive a lower rate than one who insists
on service when facilities are fully utilized. Often off-peak rates are
established between a ceiling set by competition and a floor based on
the requirement that the rates contribute something over the incre-
mental cost of the service.88 Here competition is a disruptive factor,
but the apparent discrimination against regular customers is usually
not deemed unlawful.8 9
Electric energy may be furnished more cheaply in large quantities
than in small. Accordingly, it is common to provide that energy rates
shall be built in "blocks" or have a "ladder" structure. Such rates are
designed to encourage additional consumption of energy.90 Promo-
tional rates of other types have also been tried by electric utilities.
Thus when a new appliance becomes available-hot water heaters, for
example-a utility may attempt to offer energy at lower rates for
operating such devices. Commissions, however, are not well disposed
toward this type of promotion, believing that it often results in un-
justified discrimination.91
An electric utility is sometimes permitted to lower its rates in areas
where, for one reason or another, competition prevails, such as at the
borderlines of districts occupied by other utilities. If one or the other
utility enjoys lower costs and its rates are not geographically gradu-
ated, the higher cost rival may be compelled to reduce its rates at
junction points unless a dividing line can be drawn between the two
areas.92 Even when competition indicates that rates must be reduced,
some commissions are reluctant to do so, particularly when one com-
88 See Produce Terminal Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n ex rel. Peoples
Gas, Light & Coke Co., 414 Ill. 582, 592-94, 112 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (1953) ; Illinois
Coal Operators' Ass'n, 7 P.U.R. (n.s.) 403, 415 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1934); cf.
Fleming v. Illinois Commerce Comnm'n, 388 Ill. 138, 150-54, 57 N.E.2d 384, 391-93
(1944).
8 9 But cf. DAVIDSON, PRICE DIScRmniNATIoN IN SELLING GAS AND ELECTRICITY
216-18 (1955).
90 City of St. Charles v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 21 Ill. 2d 259, 172 N.E.2d
353 (1961); Southern Cal. Edison Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 15, 38 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1957); PowER AND POLICY 54; CLEMENS, op. cit. supra note 85, at 247; Cutler, The
Elasticity of the Residential Demand for Electricity, 17 J. LAND & P.U. ECON. 242,
245 (1941).
91 New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 6 P.U.R. (n.s.) 113, 117, 119 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1934); accord, Mississippi River Power Co., 1 11. Commerce Conim'n
Rep. 34 (1921); TRoxEL, op. cit. supra note 52, at 541, 544. Compare Idaho Power
Co., 1924E P.U.R. 399, 403 (Ore. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1924). Under § 2 of the
Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731
(1914), such promotion has likewise been discouraged. See American Can Co. v.
Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919, 923-24 (5th Cir.), modified, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.),
petition for cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
92 Wedron Silica Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 387 Ill. 581, 585-86, 57 N.E.2d
349, 351 (1944) ; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 209, 211-12 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1958) ; BARNES, THE ECONOmICs oF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 294 (1942);
POWNER AND POLICY 217.
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pany intentionally undercuts the prices of the other. 3  Here again
it will be observed that competition, to the extent it appears, is a
disruptive force destroying the integrity of rate schedules. To the
extent that it reduces rates in borderline areas, it must cause com-
parable increases elsewhere and hence discrimination among patrons.
III. FINANCE
The financing of electric utilities is a subject of detailed adminis-
trative intervention. Although many commissions seem to feel that
control over rates and services is more important than scrutiny of
security issuance and capitalization,' at least thirty-two states provide
extensive powers for regulatory commissions to control the issuance of
stocks and bonds by electric companies, 95 apparently on the premise
that utility rates are directly affected by these activities. Thus the
Massachusetts department, which recently considered the financing of
a joint subsidiary designed to generate power from an atomic reactor,
approved the issuance of stock by the generating company in addition
to the customary financing of construction by bank borrowings at
short-term rates. It nevertheless required periodic reports of ex-
penditures throughout the construction period for checking by the
departmental staff. Furthermore, it passed on the rate of interest on
bonds and notes issued by the subsidiary to finance the construction of
its plant." As a matter of routine many states require competitive
bidding on all security issues rather than private placement.
93 Incorporated Town of Mapleton v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 209 Iowa 400, 406-07,
223 N.W. 476, 479 (1929); State ex rel. Spillman v. Interstate Power Co., 118 Neb.
756, 226 N.W. 427 (1929); Tampa Elec. Co., 30 P.U.R.3d 75 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util.
Comm'n, modified, 30 P.U.R.3d 286 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959); Ken-
tucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 41 P.U.R. (as.) 65, 74 (Tenna. R.R & Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1941); Department of Pub. Serv. v. Puget Sound Power & Light
Co., 20 P.U.R. (n.s.) 456, 466 (Wash. Dep't of Pub. Serv. 1937). The leading case
on the subject under § 2 of the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914), is Standard Oil Co. v. FPC, 340 U.S. 231
(1951).
94 POWER AND POLICY 256. In Illinois a utility may borrow on one-year notes
without commission approval, subject to certain limitations. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
111%, § 21 (Smith-Hurd 1954). The tone of public utility annual reports suggests
that considerable discretion is left in management with respect to short-term bank
loans and even the overall scheme of financing expansion. See, e.g., 1953 ARIZONA
Pun. SERv. Co. ANN. REP. 8.
95 PowER AND POLICY 252-53; see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 20, 21, 31
(Smith-Hurd 1954). The Federal Power Act has a similar provision, Federal Power
Act § 203, 49 Stat. 849 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 824b (1958). Wisconsin seems to be one of
the most active states in the control of security issuance. McDONALD, LET THERE BE
LIGHT 119-20 (1957). See generally TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 52, at 78, 162; Gray,
Regulation of Securities Issues of Public Utilities by the New York Public Service
Commission, 22 FORDHAm L. REv. 77 (1953). Doubts have been expressed as to
the effectiveness of such control. PowER AND POLICY 275.
06 Yankee Atomic Elec. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 308, 314-18 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util.
1959).
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Other legislation reflects fears that, if left unchecked, utilities
might tend to declare unwarranted dividends which would impair cap-
ital and weaken their ability to render service to patrons. Accordingly,
commissions are sometimes empowered to control dividend payments. 97
Operating budgets are also scrutinized by some regulatory au-
thorities,9" and it is common to control the amount of working
capital through disallowance in rate-making procedures. 9  Indeed, it
has become fashionable to disallow all utility expense for the mainte-
nance of working capital, on the theory that the business can be
operated from day to day by using tax accruals."' Whatever the
merits of such rulings, they surely go far in dictating financial methods.
Capital improvements are normally permitted by public utility
regulatory commissions. Recently the New Hampshire commission
wrote an understanding opinion allowing the inclusion of a reserve
plant in the rate base of an electric utility. The commission explained
the indivisibility of the plant and said that it would be necessary for
the utility to anticipate future demand and operate under conditions of
excess capacity until that demand fully materialized.10' Similarly,
commissions have authorized electric utilities to expend sums in the
cooperative development of atomic power plants.0 2 On the other
hand, the Maine commission slashed some $2,239,000-representing
investment in hydroelectric plants which the commission said had not
proved to have been prudent-from an electric utility's rate base.10 In
other words, the commission was retroactively directing the utility to
generate energy from coal, oil, or gas, rather than from water power.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing description, it is apparent that here and there
vestiges of discretion remain in the management of an electric utility.
97 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 27(a) (Smith-Hurd 1954); POWER A ND
PoLIcY 254, 267, 309; TROXEL, op. cit. .mpra note 52, at 162. Reorganization of public
utility companies is frequently controlled, as is the lending of funds to affiliated interests.
POWER AND POLICY 254.9 8 BARNES, op. cit. supra note 92, at 216-17.
99 Central Me. Power Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 113, 125 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959);
Narragansett Elec. Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 113, 131 (R-I. Dep't Business Regulation 1957).
100 Missouri Power & Light Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 404, 409 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1957); Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 355, 361 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Conm'n
1959).
101 Public Serv. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 113, 123-24 (N.H. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959).
102 E.g., Consumers Power Co., 30 P.U.R.3d 251, 256 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1959). The commission deferred, however, a decision with respect to the accounting
for some aspects of a nuclear power plant and directed the utility to return to the
commission for further instructions in the light of its experience. Id. at 258.
103 Central Me. Power Co., 29 P.U.tR3d 113, 120-22 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1959). Contra, State Pub. Util. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield
Gas & Elec. Co., 291 Ill. 209, 231-32, 125 N.E. 891, 900 (1920). State commissions
frequently require competitive bidding for the construction of new facilities. POWER
AND POLICY 254-55.
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Regulatory commissions do not control each and every decision
reached by the directors of such an enterprise. Particularly as to
"internal" affairs some latitude is allowed to management.
However, even in the "internal" aspects of electric utility manage-
ment, commissions exercise considerable authority. So far as the
utility's relationship to its patrons is concerned, the board of directors
is almost wholly powerless. As the Illinois court has said: "The com-
mission is not just an umpire. It has been given active functions of
policy making and supervision." '
A few activities of electric utilities may remain subject to anti-
trust legislation. While it would be absurd to subject the relationship
between utility and patron to, for example, the detailed and somewhat
incoherent proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act, to the extent
that the electric utility company is a purchaser of various commodi-
ties-such as coal-it is not apparent why that act and other antitrust
statutes ' 05 should not be applied. The test here should be the ability and
desirability of commission control supplanting the forces of the market
place. Where the relationship in question is that of the utility to its
customers, employees, and competitors, the commissions can and
should supplant antitrust; where it is that of the utility to its suppliers,
regulation may often provide neither an effective nor desirable sub-
stitute for antitrust enforcement.
Overall, however, it is abundantly apparent that there is scanty
room for application of the antitrust laws to electric utilities. At the
very least regulatory commissions should enjoy primary jurisdiction
to pass upon the legality of rates and services.106 And for reasons well
stated by several courts there is no reason to entertain antitrust actions
against electric distributing and generating companies. Thus it is not
surprising that many state court decisions have specifically found that
the legislature, in subjecting electric utilities to comprehensive regula-
tion, intended to exempt these businesses from the operations of state
1o4 Antioch Milling Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 4 Ill. 2d 200, 210, 123 N.E.2d 302,
307 (1954). However, state commissioners appointed for political reasons sometimes
lack the ability or independence to accomplish sound regulation. TROXEL, ECONOMICS
OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 88 (1947).
105 Cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334-35 (1961).
106 See Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 422-24 (1952);
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FPC, 141 F.2d 27, 30 (7th Cir. 1944). It
has been said that the FPC has no primary jurisdiction to entertain a complaint with
respect to restraint of trade. Pennsylvania Water Co. v. Consolidated Gas Co., 184
F.2d 552, 562 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950). If competitive practices
become too vigorous the courts may be called upon to intervene. Citizen's Light,
Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 Fed. 553, 558
(C.C.D. Ala. 1909). It would seem preferable for commissions to control such
matters in the normal course of regulation.
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antitrust legislation." 7 Even the new chairman of the FTC has taken
the position that electric utilities are not within the ambit of antitrust.'
It follows that contrary decisions, and particularly the amazing opin-
ions of several courts in the Penn Water litigation," 9 should be over-
ruled or expressly overturned by statutory enactment."10
107 See Weld v. Board of Gas & Elec. Light Comm'rs, 197 Mass. 556, 558, 84
N.E. 101, 102-03 (1908); State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville Ry. & Light Co.,
151 Ten. 77, 91-92, 268 S.W. 120, 124 (1925). See also Pennsylvania Water &
Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (dictum), aff'd, 343 U.S.
414 (1952); Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 244, 141 Pac.
1083, 1089 (1914) (dictum).
108 During reported hearings conducted under the auspices of Senator Kefauver's
committee, the following colloquy took place:
Mr. [Professor] Richard Ruggles: You put me in a difficult position,
because certainly in the industries that are regulated such as electric power,
public utilities, railroad transportation, I do not think competition is a good
idea.
Mr. Dixon [counsel to committee]: By all means they must be excluded.
Hearings Pursuant to S. 57 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 162 (1957). Mr. Dixon has subsequently become
chairman of the FTC.
109 For the history of the Penn Water litigation, see note 51 supra.
110 Even the most thoroughgoing regulation appears not to have destroyed the
political appeal of diatribes against "monopoly" in the electric power industry. E.g.,
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Current Antitrust Problems of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, pt. 1, at 373
(1955) (remarks of Senator Morse).
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